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A B S T R A C T
Global progress towards the goal of universal, safely managed drinking water services will be shaped by the
dynamic relationship between water risks, values and institutions. We apply Mary Douglas’ cultural theory to
rural waterpoint management and discuss its operationalisation in pluralist arrangements through networking
different management cultures at scale. The theory is tested in coastal Kenya, an area that typifies the challenges
faced across Africa in providing rural communities with safely managed water. Drawing on findings from a
longitudinal study of 3500 households, we examine how different management cultures face and manage op-
erational, financial, institutional and environmental risks. This paper makes the case for cooperative solutions
across systems where current policy effectively separates communities from the state or markets. The con-
tribution of this research is both a theoretical and empirical case to consider pluralist institutional arrangements
that enable risks and responsibilities to be re-conceptualised and re-allocated between the state, market and
communities to create value for rural water users.
1. Introduction
In the baseline year of the sustainable development agenda, 2015,
2.1 billion people lacked safely managed drinking water services
globally and 844 million people did not have basic drinking water
services (WHO/UNICEF, 2017). Around a million handpumps in rural
Africa provide water to approximately 200 million rural Africans but
break frequently, wasting billions of dollars of investment (Baumann,
2009; Baumann and Furey, 2013) and forcing the poor to regularly use
more distant and often dirty water sources. This situation is exacerbated
by an increasing frequency of extreme events, including prolonged
droughts, exerting additional stress on local water resources
(MacDonald and Calow, 2009; Taylor et al., 2012; James and
Washington, 2013; James et al., 2017). Achieving universal, safely
managed and equitable water services (WHO/UNICEF, 2015) for rural
water users requires progress in a number of areas. Often one or more of
the requirements for them to be sufficient, safe, affordable, equitable
and universal are not met depending on different management ar-
rangements of waterpoints and diverging risk perceptions of water
users. This research provides a mechanism to specify these differences
by drawing on cultural theory (Douglas, 1970, 1987, 1994, 1999;
Wildavsky, 1987) and to illustrate how this theory can help understand
the critical gap between the performance of the rural water sector and
the goals of the sustainable development agenda as well as underpin
new pluralist approaches to achieving these goals. In a pluralist
approach, the existing management types of community management,
entrepreneurial and public sector models can coexist, while water risks
are addressed within their own value frames. At the same time, it offers
an overarching response to some of the coordination challenges of in-
formation, finance, and maintenance, which all of the waterpoint
managers face irrespective of their world views.
Policy-making in relation to sustainable development is usually an
issue dealt with at the global and national levels, yet the consumption it
seeks to modify takes place at the household level (Dake and
Thompson, 1999). More specifically, the global goal of universal water
services (UN, 2015) demands equitable services for all but sustainability
of local services may depend on user payments that result in exclu-
sionary access, and thus compromise the principle of universality.
Moreover, local preferences and choices may not conform with set in-
stitutional boundaries. Universal values and experiences of uncertainty
may be in conflict at the local level. This is where culture comes in. The
theory of socio-cultural viability also known as cultural theory
(Douglas, 1994), defines “culture” as attitudes and values that justify
and stabilise an organisation, and distinguishes between four basic sets
of socio-cultural behaviour. From the perspective of psychology, Bruner
(1990) suggests that culture has the functions of encoding experience,
attributing value to experience, providing assessment criteria for pos-
sible courses of action and sharing experience and expectations. From
this perspective, different ways of managing waterpoints constitute
distinct organisational cultures. Much of the existing literature on
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cultural theory focuses on conflict between cultures (Douglas, 1999; 6,
2003; Verweij et al., 2006). The contribution of this research is twofold:
first, it focuses on cooperation between the cultures rather than conflict
within the waterpoint management system under a professional service
provider; second, it provides a mechanism for the formal recognition of
a pluralist framework and for empirical support of new approaches
towards managing rural water risks. The paper first reflects on the re-
lationship between water risks, values, and institutions in the context of
the rural water sector and the global goal of universal, safely managed
drinking water services. We present an operationalisation of the cul-
tural theory framework in the context of rural waterpoint management
and discuss its extension to pluralist arrangements. The theoretical
framework is then applied to coastal Kenya drawing on empirical
findings from a longitudinal study to examine how the four basic
management cultures postulated by cultural theory handle operational,
financial, institutional and environmental risks. It closes on the dis-
cussion of a pluralist institution in the form of a professional main-
tenance service provider that allows the coexistence of current values
while taking the risks of the different cultures as an opportunity for
cooperation. Combining the entrepreneurial domain of annual con-
tracts with collective decision-making and local ownership as well as
public sector support, it represents a creative and flexible combination
of the various ways of organising, perceiving and justifying social re-
lations (Verweij et al., 2006).
2. Background
2.1. Rural institutions
The role of institutions is to provide information and assurance
about the behaviour of others, offer incentives to behave to the benefit
of the collective good and monitor and sanction opportunistic beha-
viour (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Ways must be explored to deal ef-
fectively with complexity, uncertainty, and institutional dynamics in
the field of common-pool resource management (Ostrom, 2005). They
imply interactions between ecological and social systems (Ostrom,
2009), the diversity of livelihoods, resources and uses, the variability of
actors and their practices within heterogeneous communities, multiple
and overlapping scales, and the often non-transparent ways in which
institutions work and power operates (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015).
Understanding rural institutions requires unravelling their historical
roots as well as the frameworks through which certain kinds of in-
stitutions have been advanced in the international development sector.
Blaikie (2006) highlights that state formation following independence
set the political environment for the interface between international
funding institutions that have promoted community-based natural-re-
source management and national governments. Disregard of historical
legacies, such as Africa’s decolonisation (Mamdani, 1996), or the his-
torically grown complexity of governance structures place decen-
tralisation and institutions formed in its wake at risk of failing
(Ogbaharya, 2008). The dominance of the “community-based” ap-
proach is, not least, a result of the poor performance of many state
systems or forced state retrenchment related to structural adjustment
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Mosse, 2006; Hall et al., 2014).
Since the advocacy of community management of rural water
supply in the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation
Decade, 1981–90 (Arlosoroff et al., 1987; Churchill et al., 1987; Briscoe
and de Ferranti, 1988; ICWE, 1992), it has been used as a mechanism to
achieve a policy goal at least cost (Hope, 2015), as these waterpoints
can be independently financed and managed by communities alone or
supported by government or donors, depending on perceived need or
political demand. Although the assumed empowerment of communities
through participation, decision-making, control, ownership, and cost-
sharing seemed promising, operations, maintenance and service
delivery have barely improved (Lockwood, 2004; Blaikie, 2006; Whaley
and Cleaver, 2017). This state of affairs is attributed to poor planning
(Carter et al., 2010), limited community financing (Harvey, 2007;
Foster, 2013; Foster and Hope, 2016) and shortcomings in the institu-
tional design of management models (Whittington et al., 2008; Sara and
Katz, 2010). Revisiting the same households in unpiped sites in East
Africa in 1997, 30 years after the initial study (White et al., 1972), and
using the same sampling method originally applied, Thompson et al.
(2001) highlight that improved access to water services will depend on
strong public and private organisations that develop, operate and
maintain water systems and services sustainably. They advocate new
partnerships between the state, the private sector and civil society
which promote market-based, cooperative arrangements with a flexible
funding approach that work for the rural poor. The principle of popular
participation is emphasised but tends to be reflected more in govern-
ment and donor discourses than in the experience of rural communities
(Ribot et al., 2010), and there is a notable lack of fit between domestic
norms that constrain popular participation and “the imported institu-
tional superstructure that is intended to facilitate it” (Dill, 2010, p. 33).
This ambivalence is an issue underlying all externally developed in-
stitutional solutions to rural waterpoint management.
Cleaver (2012), building on the work of Douglas (1970, 1994), ar-
gues that if institutions can be placed in a wider governance framework,
thereby focusing on the constituent processes and practices of “in-
stitutional bricolage,” then this can help us “to understand the ways in
which actors both reproduce and reconfigure such governance ar-
rangements” (Cleaver, 2012, p. 213). According to her, it is highly
unlikely that a single institutional solution will represent all users and
livelihood interests. However, practical and policy approaches often
require simplification and standardisation of institutional form.
Drawing on the socio-cultural variability perspective of cultural theory,
this research hopes to contribute to the field of rural water services in
theory and practice by advancing an approach recognising institutional
pluralism. This concept acknowledges that the governance of resources
falls upon a variety of scales with blurred boundaries between the do-
mains of the local and the global, between which “meaning” – symbolic
authority, arrangements, values – “leaks”, as it is potentially borrowed
both ways (Douglas, 1987; Cleaver and de Koning, 2015). Cleaver
(2012) illustrates what this may imply in practice. The user group at a
waterpoint may debate exempting the poorest member from paying
maintenance charges drawing on the common experience of hardship –
for reasons of equity – or on notions of human rights borrowed from
international development discourses.
2.2. Water risks and values
Delivering safely managed drinking water services requires joint
progress on ensuring sufficient, safe, reliable, affordable and accessible
water for everyone, every day. It reflects a bold global vision and will
require an unprecedented change in institutional performance in sub-
Saharan Africa, where almost half of the global population using
drinking water from unprotected sources live, over ninety per cent of
them in rural areas (WHO/UNICEF, 2017). Whilst within mainstream
institutionalism the outcomes are clearly defined, they may diverge on
the ground due to different perceptions of risk and value. Tansey (2004)
argues that risk perceptions which are underpinned by social power are
neither irrational nor simply psychological in their origins. Cultural
theory provides an opportunity to identify what is being rejected or
defended by whom and who is being held accountable. The risks ex-
perienced in rural water services may be of operational, institutional,
financial and environmental nature. Institutional risks are determined
by the separation of powers between policy, delivery and regulation,
the degree of autonomy in managing service delivery, accountability as
well as public engagement and support. Monitoring the attainment of
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operational and financial targets across these risk factors has become
feasible through novel information systems (Thomson et al., 2012a;
Nagel et al., 2015; Kipf et al., 2016), which can transmit timely data
into the institutional domain. This lays the basis for overcoming
widespread operational risks in the fields of system maintenance, per-
formance contracts and service levels. Limiting financial risks includes
capital expenditure such as transfers, loans and grants as well as op-
erational expenditure including cost recovery, collection efficiency,
payment modes and management performance (Hope and Rouse,
2013). Finally, risk management for waterpoints also refers to en-
vironmental risks such as seasonal or drought-related poor water
quality. Ensuing water rationing and the use of alternative, non-im-
proved sources may entail public health risks (Bartram and Cairncross,
2010; Hunter et al., 2010).
The priority ranking of these various risks depends to a large degree
on the value framework of the institution managing them. By em-
ploying such a framework, institutions provide a structure to everyday
life, thus reducing uncertainty (North, 1990). Risk rankings and in-
dicators are often based on the paradigm of methodological in-
dividualism. However, this paper draws on the literature offering an
alternative perspective to understand the social construction of risk
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) through processes of value identifica-
tion and trust building (Rayner, 1993) as well as through examining
how groups select and frame risks (Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999). This
leads to the question of the viability of an institution, defined as its
capability to be sustained within its environment, despite a wide range
of external pressures and internal tensions (6, 2003). Human needs and
wants are generated, articulated, and satisfied or dismissed in an in-
stitutionalised feedback system (Douglas et al., 1998). As fairness
considerations such as trust, liability distribution, and consent (Rayner,
1993) determine people’s responses, the acceptability of risks varies.
This implies that rigid institutional structures with pre-determined
value systems may not be well-suited to deal with such a variation of
risks. Instead, a feedback loop between values, risks and institutions is
required to account for changing risks and new opportunities to be
integrated into the institutional response. This applies to the response
to water management challenges at all levels.
3. The framework of cultural theory
3.1. Four cultures managing waterpoint risks
In the absence of a formal utility to manage rural water services,
informal ways of managing shared waterpoints in rural Africa create
distinct organisational challenges moderated by contextual risks and
values. Cultural theory provides a framework to explain how world
views cohere with different solutions to organisational problems
(Grimen, 1999). In accordance with Dennett’s (1987) idea of the
person, Douglas (1999) recognises autonomy and control as prior ob-
jectives of the individual. Breaking with the assumed homogeneity of
rational beings, the related understanding of risk perception assumes
that four different kinds of persons adhering to four clearly distin-
guishable ideal cultures “use everything (including risks) to engage or
disengage with or somehow control other persons” (Douglas, 1999, p.
413). We use cultural theory to trace the views and values of actors on
the basis of their preferences (at the individual water-user level) and to
understand the social systems that are upheld by shared beliefs and
values (at the water-user group level) (Douglas, 1996; O’Riordan and
Jordan, 1999). A similar empirical approach is applied by Dake and
Thompson (1993, 1999), who measure household cultures in an as-
sessment of consumption behaviours, the management of needs and
resources in the household, and what they imply for sustainable de-
velopment. The aim here is to explain preferences for changing cultures
of waterpoint management with respect to environmental (water
availability and quality), operational (functionality of waterpoints), fi-
nancial (cost of service) and institutional (organisation of waterpoint
management) risks. Cultural theory postulates four basic cultures –
egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchy and fatalism – which corre-
spond with recognised “management cultures” in the rural water sector
– community, individualist and bureaucratic management – as well as
fatalism, characteristic of those who fail to actively organise for
managing their own waterpoint but adjust to its failure.
Each culture represented in the grid-group diagram (Fig. 1) consists
of a specific way of structuring social relations (Gross and Rayner,
1985), which are supported by a variety of perceptions, values, emo-
tions and interests. The grid axis measures the extent to which ranking
and stratification constrains and facilitates the behaviour of individuals.
The group axis measures the extent to which an overriding commitment
Fig. 1. Reframing cultural theory for waterpoint management.
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to a social unit governs the thoughts and actions of individuals (Verweij
et al., 2006). The typification into four “archetypal cultures” can be
seen as a means to understand and catalogue struggles over the legiti-
macy between and within institutions (Tansey, 2004). The individual
types provide some flexibility as at least three sets of persons are at
work in each community: those in favour of tradition and current in-
stitutions, those opening their institution up to opportunity and those
blocking the opportunities of change in favour of turning back to more
fundamental structures (Douglas, 1999). If the middle group gains
ground, change may occur. The inherent instability of each archetype is
important, as it is the engine driving continual shifts in governance
(Sharp et al., 2015). In the following discussion, the four types are
described and conceptualised within the context of waterpoint man-
agement, followed by a discussion of hybrid cultures.
3.1.1. Community
The culture classified as “egalitarian” by cultural theorists (Rayner,
1991; Douglas, 1999) is referred to as “community” culture with re-
spect to waterpoint management – defined as informal groups with a
risk-sharing approach (Schouten and Moriarty, 2003; Hope, 2014),
whose members acknowledge few differentiating prescriptions
(Wildavsky, 1987). As they tend to follow the strict-egalitarian pre-
ference for equality of condition (Rayner, 1988), this implies that risks
are borne across the user group, for example, the environmental risk of
water scarcity (Wade, 1988) is often regulated through rationing; the
financial risk of high repair costs is shared evenly among all community
members (Carter et al., 2010). This is the most common approach to
waterpoint management in sub-Saharan Africa (Foster, 2013).
Community waterpoints are usually organised collectively by water-
user committees or associations (Harvey and Reed, 2004). The com-
mittee occupies a crucial role in management, administration, opera-
tion, maintenance, and repair of the waterpoint (Harvey and Reed,
2006). It is responsible for several regular activities, including holding
meetings, setting, collecting, and saving financial contributions from
users, devising and enforcing rules, including rules around access and
use, and undertaking or securing maintenance and repair work. How-
ever, there is evidence that a well-functioning, voluntary committee
represents the exception rather than the rule if acting without struc-
tured and regularised support (Moriarty et al., 2013), which is one of
the key reasons that one in three handpumps is non-functional at any
given time in sub-Saharan Africa (RWSN, 2009). Due to limited com-
munity financing (Harvey, 2007; Skinner, 2009; Carter et al., 2010) and
shortcomings in the institutional design of management models
(Whittington et al., 2008; Sara and Katz, 2010), the concept of com-
munity management has been criticised for not living up to expecta-
tions of being an effective and apolitical tool in natural-resource man-
agement across Africa (Cleaver, 1991; Blaikie, 2006; Hope, 2015).
Therefore, approaches that acknowledge the communities’ inability to
maintain their water supply without support in the long term are re-
quired (Harvey and Reed, 2004; Lockwood, 2004).
3.1.2. Individualist
Manifestations of the “individualist culture” are those privately
managed waterpoints whose social ideal is self-regulation (Wildavsky,
1987), which may in certain cases manifest itself as self-supply (Sutton
and Harvey, 2017). The sovereignty over waterpoint management, in-
cluding the full risk, is exercised by the owner, who may engage in
entrepreneurial activities selling water from the waterpoint. Such
market actors tend to be innovative while avoiding regulatory ar-
rangements that limit their scope for decision-making (Rayner, 1991).
Thus, water prices are prone to changes depending on scarcity and
demand. As market forces apply, individualists use operational, fi-
nancial, and environmental risks as an opportunity to fill some existing
gaps in local water provision. In case of a system failure, often drastic
measures, such as selling livestock, are applied in order to restore the
functionality of the waterpoint.
3.1.3. Bureaucratic
Institutional sovereignty in decision-making is at the heart of hier-
archies (Rayner, 1991). Such “hierarchist cultures” are classified as
“bureaucratically managed” here. According to cultural theory, they
represent “institutionalised authority” (Wildavsky, 1987), drawing on
regulations that incorporate processes in people’s everyday lives into
management systems (O’Riordan and Jordan, 1999). Procedures and
rules regulate how financial, operational, or environmental risks are to
be dealt with. Cultural theory holds that hierarchies prefer to avoid
extreme uncertainty and to reduce problems to routines to which they
can apply rational procedures and decision-making tools. In the context
of waterpoint management, the sovereignty of bureaucratic institutions
is usually held by the governing body of schools, clinics or religious
institutions, bound within their rule catalogues. All members of the
bureaucratic institution are assumed to consent to the legitimacy of the
rules and those whose task it is to apply them. These institutions often
receive a financial allocation from the state for maintenance under-
takings, including water service infrastructure. Sometimes these in-
stitutions would open up the waterpoint not only to their members
(schoolchildren, patients, religious community) but also to the wider
community, thus creating permeability between the two high-group
cultures.
3.1.4. Fatalist
What we define as “fatalist culture” can be split into two kinds of
behaviour, “stoic” and “opportunist”. The former describes those who
are resigned to their fate and see little benefit from trying to re-shape it
(Douglas, 1999; O’Riordan and Jordan, 1999). Such a stoic culture may
arise when the freedom to choose has been eliminated (Douglas, 2004),
the connecting networks have broken down, or when trust has been
betrayed – for example when fees have been misappropriated. Often,
fatalists experience risk as pervasive (Tukker and Butter, 2007), show
minimal anticipation and respond, if at all, ad hoc at some point after
the event (Hood et al., 2001). With respect to waterpoint management,
this may imply that they fail to organise their waterpoint and once it
breaks down, they adjust to its failure relying on an external actor to
rehabilitate it for them (Tukker and Butter, 2007). Such management
failure could stem from a lack of economic power or intra-household
inequalities, often with a gendered dimension, as women and children
are forced to act as water collectors and thus a no-cost alternative is
accepted, discounting health and time for money. However, fatalism
may also be an active choice (Mathur, 2011) demonstrating opportu-
nistic freeriding behaviour. The opportunist may see breakdown as
inevitable but not entirely beyond their control, in contrast to the stoic.
Opportunists actively choose inaction in the case where there is a
likelihood that others, such as other members of their community, the
government or NGOs, will step in to deal with the failure – an approach
similar to the one Hollway and Enrico (2012) describe as “cynicism”.
An important question is therefore what fatalists do to ensure their
water supply while their main drinking water source is out of action.
They will use alternative sources, such as other waterpoints, wells or
surface water. The choice between improved and unimproved sources
as a distinction between the two kinds of fatalist behaviour is explored
further in the case study on coastal Kenya. Either way, the fatalist
culture manifests itself in the failures of development projects, most
commonly at the post-implementation phase (Whaley and Cleaver,
2017). A multi-country study on rural water demand in the late 1980s
(The World Bank Water Demand Research Team, 1993) implicitly in-
dicates the dilemma. The type of alternative water sources, the socio-
economic and demographic characteristics of the household and a sense
of entitlement to government services were found to influence rural
communities’ behaviour to achieving improved drinking water access.
The assumption for the fatalist culture is that the deliberate decision not
to repair the main waterpoint, or its neglect, is related to organisational
and behavioural reasons. While the motivation behind this decision is
what distinguishes “stoics” from “opportunists”, the result is the same:
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their main waterpoint remains non-functional.
3.1.5. Hybrid cultures
The four cultures are deductively derived ideal types. Real institu-
tions as we encounter them, seldom conform to only one, for example,
community waterpoints can be organised as fully egalitarian common-
pool resources (Ostrom, 1990) with rules determining usage behaviour
or as clubs with distinct membership criteria, which combine commu-
nity-managed and individualistic cultures as semi-privatisation occurs
(Koehler et al., 2015). Public-private partnerships unite the bureau-
cratic and individualistic cultures – as the ownership is public, yet the
management is outsourced to a private entity. It largely depends on
external factors whether the hierarchy, the market, or the egalitarian
orientation will be the dominant one, or whether apathy will prevail
(Verweij, 2004).
3.2. Recognising pluralist institutions
To avoid the gridlock that is likely to result from attempting to
impose one culture on all, some cultural theorists advocate “clumsy
solutions” (Lach et al., 2006; Verweij et al., 2006; Ney and Verweij,
2015), pluralist arrangements, which allow the four ideal-type cultures
to co-exist while creatively combining their seemingly irreconcilable
perspectives on problem identification and resolution – including the
hierarchical insistence on authority, the individualist emphasis on en-
trepreneurship, the egalitarian reliance on collaboration (Verweij et al.,
2006) and even fatalist stoicism or opportunism. However, the chal-
lenge is to achieve a solution that is acceptable to the advocates of the
different ways of perceiving, organising, and justifying (Lach et al.,
2006). Clumsiness concerns both the effectiveness of addressing major
social problems and the legitimacy of this process (Verweij et al., 2006).
Such solutions have been applied to a variety of complex settings in-
cluding water-related challenges such as hydropower in the Himalayas
(Gyawali, 2006), water resources management in California (Lach
et al., 2006), as well as tackling climate change (Verweij et al., 2006).
What these examples have in common is that opposing views collide
and the resulting conflicts are difficult to resolve with traditional policy
tools. The clumsy approach tends to combine all available policy styles,
connecting creative market forces with governmental planning, in-
cluding possibilities for local and civic action (Verweij et al., 2006) –
thus allowing for flexibility and strategy switching (O’Riordan and
Rayner, 1991) depending on the development of the conflict.
This research enquires into pluralist approaches in the rural water
sector that allow groups to be situated between the three core pillars of
market, bureaucracy and community, and which may facilitate risk
management through improved information flows, sustainable finance
and reliable maintenance (Thomson and Koehler, 2016). If formally
recognised, such pluralist institutions could pool the risks of the dif-
ferent cultures, which may lead to risk sharing through creating a
network with similar economies of scale. This could be compared to
piped water systems, where physical infrastructure links nodes as well
as institutional domains. The benefits may include lowering costs and
reducing conflicts by identifying more appropriate levels of responsi-
bility and delivery. Through risk pooling and networking at scale,
pluralist institutions aim to produce “satisficing” (Simon, 1979) solu-
tions to rural water challenges for the different ways of organising,
especially with regard to operational and financial risks.
The different shading in Fig. 2 represents each culture’s – potentially
varying – representation in the pluralist paradigm. First, community
management for rural water services has been enshrined in bureau-
cratic norms and rules and translated into collective decision-making
characterised by informal norms. Recently, formal rules have been
adapted in the Water Act 2016 (Republic of Kenya, 2016) to allow for
joining a professional service provision model, which may enhance
service sustainability. Second, performance-based contracts outline
entrepreneur and customer obligations, for example the provider’s duty
to restore water infrastructure within a certain period and the custo-
mers’ obligation to pay for the service. The market characterised by
individualism and competition forms the basis of this solidarity. Third,
cooperative governance, including public sector support, is a critical
component of institutional coordination through regulation of water
sector activities and sustaining financial flows. Thus, the key compo-
nents of operationalising such pluralist institutions would include a)
services through professional artisans, b) improved information flows
necessary to reduce downtimes and coordinate waterpoint main-
tenance, and c) financial sustainability through pooling financial risks
at scale, creating incentives for user payments and thus lowering costs
of bureaucratic targets (REACH, 2016). In addressing and reducing
operational, financial and managerial risks faced by the management
cultures, but not bringing them into direct conflict with one another
through prioritising or applying competing models of fairness (Rayner,
1995), this approach may lead to a cooperative, pluralist solution at
scale that creates value for all three cultures. This is in line with Hood’s
et al. (2001) demand to take a regime perspective on risk regulation
and apply a meso-level approach considering complex institutional
geographies, rules, and practices.
4. Cultural theory of waterpoint management in coastal Kenya
4.1. Study location
Coastal Kenya was one of the first sites in Africa where community
management was introduced along with the Afridev handpump in the
late 1980s (Narayan-Parker, 1988). This constituted a large-scale be-
haviour change for waterpoint management. Twenty-five years later, a
maintenance service provision model was introduced through action
research to test community preferences for all repairs completed in
72 hours (SSEE, 2014). Kwale County has a population of around
730,000, eighty per cent rural, with a high poverty rate ranked 41st out
of 47 counties (Commission on Revenue Allocation, 2013). According
to the 2009 census, around 22% of the county’s households use pro-
tected wells and boreholes as their main water sources (Kenya National
Bureau of Statistics, 2012). The empirical data referring to waterpoints
in this research draw exclusively on handpumps as the most common
point sources which are not piped to individual premises. Of the 300
waterpoints that were identified as functional or short-term non-func-
tional and included in the analysis, 75% adhere to the community-
managed culture, defined here as being organised by a community
committee; 14% are individualists managing their waterpoints pri-
vately; and 11% constitute bureaucratic institutions, comprised of
schools, health centres and religious institutions in this study, which
usually allow the wider community to use their waterpoints. While
these 300 waterpoints exhibit one or another of the three decision-
making cultures, 39% of the 571 waterpoints sampled in total in the
waterpoint audit in August 2013 had been broken for more than one
year and are defined as fatalist here.
4.2. Risks and the four cultures
Key operational, financial, managerial and environmental risks fa-
cing waterpoint users in Kwale County are captured in Table 2. Prior to
data collection, research permits and approvals were obtained from the
Government of Kenya’s National Council of Science and Technology
and the Central University Research Ethics Committee at the authors’
institution. The risks assessed include perceived risks by water users
and observed risks measured in terms of water quantity and quality as
well as managerial responsibilities elicited in a waterpoint audit. Per-
ceived risks were captured during three waves of a longitudinal
household survey conducted around these waterpoints in Kwale County
in October 2013–January 2014, March–May 2015 and September–No-
vember 2016 (wave 1: n=3349; wave 2: n= 3567; wave 3:
n=3542). A team of 25 local enumerators was trained, the instrument
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was piloted and administered in the local languages, pre-dominantly
Swahili and Digo. Household respondents across a stratified random
sample from three sub-counties, Matuga, Msambweni and Lunga Lunga,
were interviewed. During these campaigns water quality tests were
conducted at each waterpoint, taking measures for the electrical con-
ductivity of the groundwater. These data as well as data collected
during the audit of 571 waterpoints fitted with Afridev handpumps in
August 2013 were used for the observed data (average downtime days).
Unique hourly volumetric data were collected on observed handpump
usage over a twelve-month period from January to December 2014
from 300 handpumps fitted with Waterpoint Data Transmitters
(Thomson et al., 2012a).
We first compare the active-management cultures with one another
and then highlight a number of observations about the fatalists, who
adjust to waterpoint failure (Table 1). The large standard deviations
suggest that within each culture there remains a wide variation in risk
perception (Table 2), which shows that in practice management ar-
rangements are a bit messier than the ideal-typical typology. Hence, the
mean is an imperfect measure to capture each culture’s standpoint.
First, among the three active-management cultures, the community-
run systems face the highest operational challenges in terms of down-
time (36%) – 83% higher than those of bureaucratic institutions – but
also have the highest demand in terms of abstraction rates (around 10
cubic metres per week), which is close to one-and-a-half times the de-
mand of individualists. Whilst just about half of the community-man-
aged waterpoints have regular payments in place (52%), they are the
culture with the highest number of penalties for non-payment (41%).
Communities therefore have to strike a difficult balance between ser-
ving highest water demand for a large number of users (45 households
on average) while facing the longest downtimes, and collecting suffi-
cient financial resources. In comparison to the other cultures, observed
risks for the community-managed culture in terms of downtimes, ab-
straction rates and payment systems appear to be higher than perceived
risks such as concerns about reliability, availability or affordability.
Second, compared to households at community and bureau-
cratically managed waterpoints, individualists are slightly poorer, both
in terms of subjectively stating they are poor (as opposed to average or
well-off) and a welfare index that calculates the poorest quintile along
indicators clustered into five groups: household composition, dwelling
characteristics, asset ownership, sanitation and health as well as
drinking water (UPGro, 2017). Their perception of being slightly poorer
may highlight their concern about the affordability of water, a concern
that is almost twice as high as that of communities and bureaucratic
institutions. Despite the concern about cost, they are the culture with
the highest percentage of spare parts stored at their pump – almost 60%
more than communities and 46% more than bureaucratic institutions –
which may indicate they internalise risk to ensure that their small en-
terprises are not interrupted for too long. Moreover, they have a slightly
higher concern with water quality and the reliability of their waterpoint
compared to communities and bureaucratic institutions.
Third, within the bureaucratic culture, comprised of schools, clinics
and mosques, there is particularly great concern over water availability
– almost four times that of individualists and more than one and a half
times that of communities. In addition, there are water quality concerns
as salinity levels of the water at bureaucratically managed waterpoints,
measured by electrical conductivity (EC), are substantially higher than
at individualist and community-managed ones. Access, availability and
quality appear to be the priority for this culture.
Finally, it is important to note that the fatalists’ responses refer to
the past when their waterpoint was still working; their reliance on re-
call implies limitations of the data. The volumetric abstraction rate
dates from 2014 when some of the waterpoints were still operational
Fig. 2. A pluralist institutional network to recognise and promote cooperative management cultures.
Table 1
Alternative sources for fatalists.
dry season wet season
Improved alternative 54% 51%
Alternative handpump under active management 22% 20%
Piped 11% 10%
Submersible pump (public or private) 10% 11%
Protected well (public or private) 7% 6%
Public kiosk/tap 4% 4%
Unimproved alternative 39% 34%
Unprotected well (public or private) 26% 12%
Surface water (river, stream, pond, dam, lake) 13% 12%
Rainwater harvesting – 10%
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but remained dysfunctional after a subsequent breakdown. The most
striking difference from the other cultures is the downtime of over one
year. On average, this group recalls a period of non-functionality of
almost eight years (with a standard deviation of six years). However,
even before the breakdown their concern over reliability was higher
than for the active-management cultures. This may relate to a collec-
tive-action problem (Olson, 1965), as the group size was also the big-
gest before breakdown. The concern about costliness was a third to
three times higher than for the active-management cultures.
In terms of welfare levels (subjective and welfare index), the cul-
tures do not vary substantially (though the overall percentage of
households within the poorest quintile is highest for fatalists). The
fatalists’ regular payments score used to be lowest compared to the
other cultures, which corresponds with the fact that their management
system has since collapsed and the attitude of “let’s wait for someone
else to come along and fix it” prevails. Therefore, it is important to
examine which alternative sources fatalists use since their main wa-
terpoint has been non-functional for over one year. We divide them into
two categories according to their adjustment to waterpoint failure
(Table 1): they use an improved alternative, such as an actively-man-
aged handpump, piped water, water from a submersible pump, pro-
tected well or kiosk, or an unimproved alternative, such as an un-
protected well, surface water or rainwater. In both wet and dry seasons,
more than half of them use an equivalent or improved water source,
which might suggest opportunist behaviour. On the other hand, 39% in
the dry season and 34% in the wet season opt for unimproved sources,
the implications of which are further highlighted in the discussion. This
suggests that fatalists strike the trade-off between collecting water at
more distant sources and having a reliable waterpoint closer to home in
favour of less commitment to regular management tasks. Given the high
number of unimproved sources, fatalists have by far the highest score
for considering their water unsafe to drink (22%), which may explain
why 82% state that if their waterpoint was repaired, they would use it
as their main drinking water source.
These results demonstrate that all water management cultures face
various operational, financial, managerial and environmental risks in
different intensity, across both user perceptions and observation. The
overarching risk of long downtimes is marked for all groups, ranging
from 20 days for bureaucratic institutions to 36 days for communities
and over a year for fatalists. Some of the financial, managerial and
environmental risks seem to be underlying causes for non-functionality.
Hence, all require an approach that allows them to continue managing
their risks in their own ways but overcomes some of the obstacles that
lead to system failure.
4.3. Addressing the risks through a professional maintenance service
provider
Risks faced by the various cultures become an opportunity for a
professional service provider representing a pluralist solution which
may even out some of the discrepancies between regulation and prac-
tice (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015). Such an approach has been tested
in Kwale County under the FundiFix model (SSEE, 2015). Operational
risks are reduced and reliability of the waterpoint is increased through a
contractual guarantee of downtime reduction to a maximum of three
days – a major improvement from downtimes of between 20 and 36
days of the three active-management cultures. Financial risks can be
reduced as the contract requires equal, affordable monthly payments
that will, in part, insure against standard repair costs, as defined in the
contract. Fees are collected in line with each management culture’s
preference, either through monthly payments by the committee or on a
pay-as-you-go basis by an attendant. These are then transferred to
FundiFix using mobile phone payments. Once the payment is received,
ten community members are sent a message confirming the amount
transferred and when the next payment is due. This emerging model
explicitly aims to increase accountability for the often opaque financial
management systems that may create community distrust and man-
agement failure (Foster and Hope, 2016). However, a further evaluation
of payment behaviour and regularity over time is needed as this will
ultimately determine how sustainable the approach is. Management
risks are reduced by pooling, and therefore lowering, systemic risks
across communities with spare parts, transport and pre-financing to
promptly respond to idiosyncratic failure events (Harvey and Reed,
2004; Thomson et al., 2012b). Environmental risks both in terms of
water quality and quantity are currently not addressed by FundiFix but
could be integrated into the model in the future, for example through
regular water quality monitoring and water treatment provision.
Table 2
Water risks applied to the four cultures.
Risk Variable Community Individualist Bureaucratic Fatalist
n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD
Operational Risk
Perceived Concern: distance to next waterpoint (%) (HH)a 1461 19.51 39.64 257 19.84 39.96 214 25.70 43.80 928 49.78 49.99
Concern: reliability of waterpoint (%) (HH) 1461 15.33 36.04 257 17.12 37.74 214 15.42 36.20 928 24.14 42.81
Observed Average downtime (days) (WP)b 201 35.74 72.53 29 23.93 72.46 34 19.53 54.58 223 >365 –
User group size (members) (WP) 194 44.95 47.62 34 32.91 20.46 21 41.74 28.75 223 50.57 69.15
Financial Risk
Perceived Concern: water is costly (%) (HH) 1461 6.50 24.67 257 10.89 31.22 214 5.61 23.06 928 14.54 35.27
Subjective poor (%) (HH) 1461 56.88 49.54 257 67.70 46.85 214 66.36 47.36 928 62.50 48.44
Observed Regular payments (%) (WP) 189 51.85 50.10 37 48.65 50.67 30 43.33 50.40 184 40.41 49.10
Poorest quintile (%) (HH) 1461 18.75 39.05 257 23.35 42.39 214 22.43 41.81 928 24.11 42.97
Management Risk
Perceived Concern: long queue at waterpoint (%) (HH) 1461 20.26 40.21 257 12.84 33.52 214 21.50 41.18 928 16.16 36.83
New users allowed to join waterpoint (%) (HH) 1453 57.26 49.49 257 47.86 50.05 209 62.20 48.60 – – –
Observed Spare parts stored at handpump (%) (WP) 189 15.34 36.14 37 24.32 43.50 30 16.67 37.90 – – –
Penalty no payment (%) (WP) 200 40.50 49.21 37 29.73 46.34 31 38.71 49.51 184 35.24 47.80
Environmental Risk
Perceived quantity Concern: water not available all year (%) (HH) 1362 13.07 66.28 257 5.84 76.51 208 22.12 58.40 928 11.85 32.34
Observed quantity Volumetric use (mean m3/week) (WP) 197 10.3 7.9 37 6.9 4.7 31 9.5 8.7 16 5.7 9.9
Perceived quality Concern: water unsafe to drink (%) (HH) 1461 8.69 28.18 257 11.28 31.70 214 8.88 28.51 928 22.31 41.65
Observed quality Electrical conductivity (μS) (WP) 198 996.29 1159.46 37 897.50 1081.62 31 1547.81 2046.80 – – –
a HH: household level.
b WP: waterpoint level.
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5. Through pluralism towards cooperation and institutional
integration
Here, we advance the concept of what cultural theorists call “clumsy
solutions” – policies that creatively integrate opposing perspectives on
complex problems and potential resolution mechanisms (Verweij et al.,
2006) – towards cooperation and integration. One of the key criticisms
of clumsy solutions is that they are inherently inefficient (Verweij et al.,
2006; Ney and Verweij, 2015). In contrast, we argue that institutional
arrangements at a level combining multiple waterpoints in a network
can, at least partially, reduce operational and financial inefficiencies by
pooling finances and operating at scale. The active-waterpoint cultures
do not have to change their own organisation, but can be nested within
a larger system that addresses their operational and financial risks.
Hence, instead of bringing the waterpoints into conflict or forcing them
into a compromise, risk is potentially reduced through cooperation.
Another question is whether the model is truly pluralist or leans
towards one of the four cultures. It clearly has characteristics of an
entrepreneurial approach being organised through contracts and
monthly payments. However, sign-up and fee collection are still an
egalitarian process managed by the user group. Moreover, sustainable
cost recovery is a necessary financial condition for system stability re-
quiring some form of fungible and targeted funds to close the gap be-
tween user payments and full operational costs; this underlines a key
dimension of the state in supporting this pluralist solution. The limited
sustainability of rural water systems in Africa reflects the fragile bal-
ance that must be maintained in linking and moderating the cultural
variations of risks and values.
This approach is not a panacea as it does not, in its current form,
provide a pathway towards achieving universality. Cleaver and de
Koning (2015) argue that processes of bricolage produce both intended
and unintended outcomes, which makes it difficult to judge the success
or effectiveness of such arrangements. One such unintended outcome
may be that fatalists are excluded from the pluralist arrangement under
a professional service provider, unless specific provisions are made to
admit them. Since they do not manage their own waterpoints to keep
them functional, they have to draw water from alternative sources to
survive. As outlined in Section 3.1.4, this choice divides the fatalists
into two sub-groups. The opportunists refuse to manage their own
waterpoint but choose an equal or improved arrangement managed by
another user group, even if it is further away. This approach comprises
more than half of the fatalists in Kwale, who may be required to pay for
the water at the alternative source but are not involved in other man-
agement tasks. Those left behind, on the other hand, draw water from
unimproved sources, which are usually free. The former, it could be
argued, capitalise on other management schemes and can indirectly be
included in the pluralist arrangement through actively managed cul-
tures, whereas the latter, just under 40% of Kwale’s fatalists, cannot.
Even if their waterpoints were rehabilitated, their user groups would
need to organise to regularly contribute to the maintenance model.
Thus, the mechanism leaves a gap for those groups that fail or refuse to
organise. How to overcome this obstacle remains a serious challenge
requiring some targeted research into alternative measures, for example
social policy and protection programmes. Thus, the approach con-
stitutes a fragile solution, which aims to achieve SDG target 6.1 while
raising the important question whether all people can be reached and
whether it is feasible to integrate all waterpoints.
Another limitation is that the FundiFix model has been con-
ceptualised and implemented as an external intervention. Whether it
can bridge the gap between formal and informal water institutions and
form a cooperative network at the meso-level (Peters et al., 2012) that
allows cultural plurality while advancing the sustainable development
agenda, depends on its ability to integrate into the wider system of
regulation and governance (Hood et al., 2001). Further research also
needs to be conducted to better understand the factors that trigger rural
water users to join the pluralist model, the potential barriers that
remain for signing up, and if, in fact, it is a solution for many and not
for few.
6. Conclusion
This study provides evidence of different local ways of managing
water risks and how these practices can contribute to subnational and
national policy-making. It addresses the question if and how pluralist
institutions, understood within the framework of cultural theory, may
represent new approaches to bridge the critical gap between perfor-
mance in the rural water sector and the ambitious water goal of the
sustainable development agenda. This gap stems, to a degree, from the
paradox of the promotion of universal values on the one hand and the
variation of values at the local level on the other hand. Drawing on
cultural theory, this research recognises the variation in values and risk
perceptions and provides a framework for the discussion whether this
paradox can be addressed through institutions that allow pluralism at
the local waterpoint level and at the same time follow more formal rules
and procedures which could eventually be integrated into formal reg-
ulation regimes. We make the case for more integrated solutions in
areas where current policy separates communities from the state or
markets. The paper shows how this was tested and applied in the
context of rural Kenya. It also shows the potential for pooling risks in a
professional service provider, which might be capable of reducing un-
certainty through new observed information flows enabling rapid re-
sponses to waterpoint failures. The contribution of this research is both
a theoretical and empirical case to consider a more collective ar-
rangement, provided results translate into meaningful benefits for the
water users in the form of significant improvements in infrastructure
reliability and investment accountability. However, the system requires
both scale and temporal cohesion, which depends on state support. In
addition, the financial sustainability of the system will likely collapse
without provision of a mechanism to acknowledge variable and in-
sufficient cost recovery from water users.
Recognising that resources are governed at a variety of scales with a
dynamic relationship between the local and the global, the cultural
theory of drinking water risks advanced here provides an opportunity to
understand how global goals, such as safely managed and equitable
water services, may be pursued while integrating local institutions into
a coherent governance regime. This approach is not necessarily limited
to the rural water sector or to Kenya. Other fields where energy, food,
health, education or financial services and resources intersect will be
moderated by similar cultural complexities and may be subject to si-
milarly simplistic governance regimes; they too may benefit from the
application of the framework proposed here. To achieve a functioning
model through such pluralist institutions, more profound under-
standing into the workings of the sector is needed. Most notably, it has
to be acknowledged that for progress towards the sustainable devel-
opment goals policy needs to reflect how the plurality of risks and
values are conceptualised and how they are potentially pooled across
community, state and market institutions.
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